Myanmar after Military Coup Part 2(軍事クーデター後のミャンマー②)

We already recognized how military coup of Myanmar atrocious impact society and economy, in part 1 of this article, and we can learn how the military coup has triggered a major surge in both internal and external migration, with significant humanitarian, economic, and political implications both within the country and across the region in this part. 

The migration trends in Myanmar have significantly changed after the military coup in February 2021 in the following ways:

1. Internal Migration Disrupted: The conventional pattern of internal migration from rural to urban areas for employment has been disrupted due to the escalating armed conflict across many regions, including the heartland areas. Frequent airstrikes, shelling, and insecurity have forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes and migrate internally to seek safety.(*1)

2. Outmigration Increased: Many people have fled Myanmar to neighboring countries like Thailand to avoid atrocities committed by the military junta. Economic factors like business closures, job losses and lack of opportunities due to the compound impacts of the coup and COVID-19 have driven outmigration. A survey found many migrants are now looking for opportunities in neighboring countries instead of urban centers within Myanmar.(*2)

3. Reverse Migration: The report notes an interesting trend of young and energetic Rakhine migrants returning from abroad to their homeland of Rakhine State to join the armed revolutionary forces against the junta. This reverse migration is driven by the collective Arakan nationalist aspirations instead of personal economic motives.(*3)

The military coup has disrupted traditional internal migration for economic reasons, while driving increased outmigration to flee violence and instability, as well as some reverse migration of diaspora groups joining armed resistance movements against the junta.

The primary destinations for migrants from Myanmar after military coup

1. Thailand hosts the largest number of Myanmar migrants, with an estimated 3 million Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand prior to the coup and most of migrant after the coup are heading to Thailand more illegal ways than legal.(*4)

2. Malaysia is another significant destination for Myanmar migrants, though the numbers are not as high as in Thailand. There are hundreds of thousands of undocumented Myanmar workers in Malaysia in addition to documented ones.

3. Some Myanmar people are also fleeing to other neighboring countries like India and China to escape the violence and instability following the coup. And then the migration to other destinations include Japan, South Korea, and Singapore significantly increase after military coup.

4. Urban centers within Myanmar like Yangon (58% of internal migrants) and Mandalay were the conventional pattern prior to the coup for economic reasons. However, this has been disrupted by the escalating conflict and some areas move for the security concern as conflict.

The primary reason and driver of leaving the country has been security concerns and a desire to escape the military's brutal crackdown, arbitrary arrests, and violence against civilians. And then, economic factors like business closures, job losses, and lack of opportunities due to the combined impacts of the coup and COVID-19 have also pushed many to migrate. The military's announcement of enforcing mandatory conscription for men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 has triggered a new wave of panic and desperation among the youth, with thousands queuing in front of embassies to seek visas and some queuing at the border across gate, some leave by illegal Parth and some attempt to suicide because of they don’t want to follow that order.

Therefore, young professionals, students, and also skilled and unskilled workers are trying to leave Myanmar to avoid being conscripted by the military. There are concerns about a "brain drain" as skilled workers and professionals emigrate from Myanmar, depriving the country of valuable human capital and that increased out-migration of skilled labor constrain Myanmar's economic potential and productivity growth. However, under renewed military rule and pandemic-related travel restrictions, many individuals trying to leave Myanmar have encountered bureaucratic delays, state-imposed barriers, and exploitation by unscrupulous brokers. Some aspiring migrants have sought to reach foreign countries through perilous irregular channels, facing risks of trafficking and abuse.

What are the Role of Migrants in resistance Military Coup and How and Why Host Countries should Support Migrants from Myanmar? 

Myanmar migrants abroad are playing a vital role in supporting the pro-democracy resistance movement, providing financial support, and connecting the revolution to the outside world. This financial support to resistance movement from migrants and famished of foreign currency by junta force military to impose new Remittances Law in on 1 September 2023. According to that law, the junta has tried to collect income tax from overseas Myanmar workers and pressured them to transfer 25% of their income to domestic banks in Myanmar and that highly problematic law exert control over the flow of foreign currency.

The new law has significantly increased the financial burden and pressure on Myanmar migrant workers abroad, who are already facing heightened economic precarity due to the coup and pandemic. Migrant workers are now compelled to send a quarter of their earnings back to Myanmar, limiting their ability to save or support their families in the country. Some students who had already gone abroad to pursue higher studies joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) by participating in protests, advocacy efforts, and fundraising for the pro-democracy movement from their host countries. Myanmar government staff and civil servants working or studying overseas resigned from their positions in solidarity with the CDM, cutting off a source of skilled labor for the junta. The diaspora community, including students and migrant workers, became a vital source of funding for the CDM and ethnic armed groups resisting the military withing countries, through remittances and donations.

Supporting the migrants from Myanmar is also one approach of supporting Myanmar citizen in trying to escape from injustice control and in fighting for their freedom and right. Because most of the migrants’ people, but not all, from Myanmar are playing a vital role in supporting the pro-democracy resistance movements in their own ways. Therefore, the host countries, including Japan, should support that migrants from Myanmar through facilitate legal migration pathways by creating or expanding legal migration channels, such as labor migration schemes and student visas, reduction some restrictions and difficulties on applying and extending their visa status, etc. to allow Myanmar nationals to seek safety and economic opportunities abroad and this can help prevent migrants from resorting to dangerous irregular migration routes and others safety concerns. Suspend the deportation of Myanmar nationals and provide temporary protected status or other forms of legal stay to allow them to remain safely, while also contributing to a durable solution to the broader political and humanitarian crisis in the country. Ultimately, host countries should leverage their diplomatic influence to pressure the Myanmar military junta to end the violence, restore democracy, and address the root causes driving people to flee the country.



1. 国内移住の混乱:雇用を求めて農村部から都市部へ国内移住する従来のパターンは、中核地域を含む多くの地域で武力紛争が激化しているため、妨げられている。頻繁な空爆、砲撃、治安の悪化により、何十万人もの人々が安全を求めて家を追われ、国内での移住を余儀なくしている。

2. 国外流出の増加:軍事政権による残虐行為を避けるため、多くの人々がミャンマーからタイなどの近隣諸国に逃れている。クーデターと新型コロナウイルス感染症の複合的な影響による事業の閉鎖、雇用の喪失、機会の欠如などの経済的要因が人口流出を引き起こしている。調査によると、多くの移民が現在、ミャンマー国内の都市部ではなく近隣諸国に機会を求めていることが判明した。

3. 逆移住:報告書は、若くて精力的なラカイン州移民が、国外から故郷のラカイン州に戻り、軍事政権に対抗するため武装革命軍に参加しているという興味深い傾向を指摘している。この逆移住は、個人の経済的動機ではなく、ラカイン州の少数民族武装勢力「アラカン軍」の願いによって動かされている。



1. 最も多くのミャンマー移民を受け入れているのはタイだ。クーデター前は推定300万人のミャンマー人出稼ぎ労働者がタイにいた。しかし、クーデター後の移民のほとんどは違法にタイに向かっている。

2. マレーシアもミャンマー移民にとって重要な目的地であるが、その数はタイほど多くはない。マレーシアには、正規のミャンマー人労働者に加え、不法滞在のミャンマー人労働者が数十万人もいる。

3. クーデター後の暴力や不安定な状況から逃れるため、インドや中国などの近隣諸国に避難するミャンマー人もいる。そして軍事クーデター後、日本、韓国、シンガポールなど他の目的地への移住も大幅に増加した。

4. 経済的理由からヤンゴン(国内移民の58%)やマンダレーなどのミャンマー国内の都市部へ移動することは、従来のパターンであった。しかし、これは紛争の激化によって妨げられ、一部の地域では安全保障上の懸念から紛争となっている。

国外退去の主な理由と原動力は、安全保障への懸念と、軍による残忍な弾圧、恣意的逮捕、民間人に対する暴力から逃れたいというものであった。さらに、クーデターと新型コロナウイルス感染症の複合的な影響による事業の閉鎖、雇用の喪失、機会の欠如などの経済的要因も、多くの人を移住に駆り立てている。 18~35歳の男性と18~27歳の女性に強制徴兵を実施するという軍の発表(のちに女性は当面除外を発表)は、若者の間でパニックと絶望の波を引き起こした。数千人がビザを求めて大使館の前に列を作り、ゲートを越えて国境に並ぶ人もいた。違法に国を去る人、その命令に従いたくないため自殺を図る人もいるのが現状だ。






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